INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 1 became the first global health treaty negotiated under the auspices of WHO, following four years of intense negotiations. The development of the FCTC was unusual for its high level of Member State engagement, particularly that of developing countries 2 whose influence was seen as a key factor in the strength of the resulting Convention. 3 In the context of global governancewhere the interests of poorer countries are often overshadowed by those of powerful elites [4] [5] [6] -such an achievement is to be highly prized.
While the FCTC is justly hailed as a public health triumph, 7, 8 its success is reliant upon the strength and coherence of the international movement that gave rise to its existence and that sustains and protects its realisation in the face of persisting challenges. 2 This is widely acknowledged with reference to the need for accelerated implementation of core FCTC measures at national level. There is growing evidence that such implementation accelerates tobacco control measures and reduces smoking prevalence. 7, 9 Yet while the Convention has now been ratified by 180 countries and the European Union, 10 only an estimated 10% of the world's population are protected by best practice in tobacco taxation, with comprehensive advertising bans and smoke-free environments covering just 15% and 20% respectively.
11
Progress in many areas is hampered by competing priorities, 12 limited national capacity 13 and the active opposition of the industry. 14, 15 The salience of such political dynamics illustrates that there is nothing inevitable about the success of the FCTC process, highlighting the importance of key governance attributes. Of particular significance here is the Conference of the Parties (COP), the governing body Among multiple challenges confronting the COP, 16 its attributes of participation and representation have become both politicised and increasingly vulnerable in two key respects.
Firstly, the issue of travel support to enable developing country participation in the COP became highly contested following COP4. 16, 17 The active leadership role of low and lowermiddle income countries, widely seen as critical to the success of FCTC negotiations, 2, 3 has been underpinned by their receipt of travel support to enable attendance. The implementation of a COP4 decision to adopt a far more restrictive policy (for 'least developed' countries) was delayed during COP5-COP7 via successive ad hoc funds, with the Head of the Convention Secretariat warning of "a risk that the COP would no longer be quorate" (p30) 18 in their absence. 19 Alongside anxiety about a widening democratic deficit in the FCTC, discussions at COP6 and COP7 were characterised by increasing concern about country delegations with tobacco industry affiliations. Potential responses to this issue included consideration of requiring delegates to declare any such links 20 while civil society participants at COP7 noted an apparent evolution in tobacco industry strategy, with some country delegations obstructively deploying procedural or legalistic arguments to delay discussions. 21 The significance afforded by the tobacco industry in seeking to influence the work of the COP was subsequently demonstrated by an internal PMI document obtained by Reuters. 22 This framed the FCTC as "a regulatory runaway train" in which health concerns dominate over other interests; the document set out PMI's aim to "[p]ush for a balanced delegation", by encouraging greater representation of finance, foreign affairs, customs and commerce ministries in national delegations. 23 In this context, it becomes increasingly important to understand the dynamics of the COP and to discuss their implications for tobacco control policy. This paper aims to build on an earlier analysis of participation at COPs 1-4 16 to consider developments in countries' participation, including by income group; to examine changes in the composition of delegations (with reference to the proportion of health officials); and to assess the relationship between participation in the COP and the strength of key tobacco control measures at national level.
METHODS i) Participation in the FCTC COP
Building on previous work, 17 excluded from analyses by income group -i.e. they were not included in the list of potential attendees for this analysis.) We further examined the proportion of total delegates at each COP that came from each income group, and the proportion of delegates affiliated with specific government departments (including health and non-health agencies).
ii) Relationship between participation in COP and strength of tobacco control
We examined the relationship between Parties' attendance across the first seven COP meetings and the strength of their tobacco control policies, as stated in the 2017 global tobacco control reports. 11 We focused on three key measures of tobacco control: increased taxes on tobacco products; protecting people from tobacco smoke via legislation enforcing smoke-free environments in public places; and bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. (Parties to the FCTC report against six key measures of implementation, of which these three measures -alongside public information campaigns -are ranked on the Tobacco Control Scale as having the greatest impact. 32 We did not use public information campaigns as part of our assessment, because countries' use of these is not consistent over time; that is, countries may have had no recent public information campaigns despite having invested in them in the past.) For each measure, we created a three-point categorisation (table   1) Bans on all forms of direct and indirect advertising *The global tobacco control reports list seven specific public places that may be covered by smoke-free legislation, with an eighth category for 'All other public places' †'Comprehensive' refers to the level of implementation reached by the top third of Parties for that measure (rather than 'best practice') We examined the relationship between Parties' COP attendance and the strength of their tobacco control policies based on both categories of attendance (<=1 meetings; 2-6 meetings; all 7 meetings) and the total number of meetings attended (0-7). For the former (categories of COP attendance), we examined the correlation with the extent of implementation visually and by calculating Goodman and Kruskal's gamma coefficients 33 for each tobacco control measure. For the latter (total number of meetings attended), we used binomial logistic regression analysis to assess the association between COP meeting attendance and 'comprehensive implementation' of each measure. Participation in the COP has consistently been higher among low and lower-middle income countries, which typically make up around half the Parties represented at the meetings (supplementary table 2 ). At COP7, for example, attendance among eligible low-and lowermiddle income countries was 82%, while among high and upper-middle income countries it was only 73%. Overall, low and lower-middle income countries are more likely to have attended some or all of the seven COP meetings (supplementary table 3) with only 5.4% never attending or attending only once, compared with the 9% of high and middle-income countries that have attended only once or not at all.
While low and lower-middle income countries are more likely to attend the COP, they tend to have much smaller delegations than high or upper-middle income countries. Thus delegates from low and lower-middle income countries have historically comprised only a quarter to a third of all country delegates (supplementary table 4), despite making up half the Parties represented at the meeting. The proportion of delegates from low and lower-middle-income countries has slightly increased over time and was particularly high at the last COP in India (a lower-middle income country), although all other COP meetings were numerically dominated by delegations from wealthier countries.
We also found considerable variation in the composition of delegations by income group, and over time. Delegations from lower income countries are more likely to be drawn from national ministries of health and tobacco control focal points, which together comprise over 60% of delegates from low income countries; while delegates from non-health departments such as foreign affairs and finance make up a greater proportion of delegations from higher income countries, with health departments making up just 42% of all delegates (figure 2).
The proportion of COP delegates drawn from ministries of health (including tobacco control focal points) was particularly low at COP1 in Geneva, reflecting the tendency for many countries to utilise their standing diplomatic representatives to the United Nations. While the proportion of health-focused delegates has been strikingly higher outside of Geneva, this has tended to decrease over time (table 2) ; from a high of almost two-thirds of delegates at COP3, at the most recent COP session (COP7) in 2016, ministries of health contributed only a third of all meeting delegates. 
We found evidence of a correlation between Parties' attendance at COP meetings and the strength of their national tobacco control policies, as indicated by our three chosen measures.
The proportion of Parties with comprehensive implementation of policies (for tobacco taxation, smoke-free environments and advertising bans) increased with increasing frequency of attendance at the COP meetings ( figure 3 ). This relationship is clearest for taxation and advertising bans (gamma coefficient = 0.35 for both), and weakest for smoke-free policies (gamma coefficient = 0.29). The strength of this relationship appears to be mediated by income group as well as the specific tobacco control measure examined (supplementary table 5 ). When we stratified
Parties by income, we found that low-income countries showed a particularly strong correlation between COP attendance and implementation of advertising bans (gamma coefficient = 0.65). High-income and lower-middle income countries showed a moderate correlation between COP attendance and implementation of tobacco taxes (coefficient = 0.38 and 0.37 respectively), while upper-middle income countries showed a moderate correlation between COP attendance and implementation of smoke-free environments (coefficient = 0.31). We were unable to perform logistic regression by income sub-group as small numbers in some cells meant the model was unstable. Participation in the COP is important for maintaining representation and accountability in both formal decision-making terms and with respect to the legitimacy and efficacy of the COP as a negotiating forum. A turnout rate of 66% is required for the COP to be able to take decisions. 34 While attendance to date has remained above this level, the general downward trend raises the possibility that turnout at a future COP meeting could drop below the required threshold for the session to be able to perform its crucial governance functions. In addition to jeopardising the formal requirement for quoracy, the experience of other global governance mechanisms suggests that declining attendance could trigger diverse problems including reduced buy-in from disenfranchised Parties, weakened legitimacy and accountability, and -ultimately -stalling of progress on FCTC implementation. This highlights the potential seriousness of problems posed to the work and viability of the COP, underpinning the risk for tobacco control of sleepwalking towards chaos in the absence of support that can ensure effective participation.
DISCUSSION
In relation to participation by low and lower-middle-income countries, their strong attendance record highlights their importance in maintaining adequate representation at COP meetings.
Participation rates for high and upper-middle income Parties have fallen below 66% at three of the seven COP meetings (supplementary table 2), meaning these meetings have been crucially reliant on much higher levels of attendance among low and lower-middle income countries. The decision to substantially reduce travel support to the majority of these countries 28 could therefore have serious consequences, not only for their representation and involvement in decision-making, but for the viability of the entire COP process.
Beyond the basic issues of numbers, it will be important to monitor both participation and discussions emerging from the eighth COP in Geneva in order to address key questions regarding the governance dynamics of tobacco control and global health. It seems almost certain that the proportion of COP delegates drawn from ministries of health will continue to decline, given the understandable pressures on financially straitened governments to rely on diplomatic missions to provide representation. Additionally, the fact that the Illicit Trade
Protocol came into effect in 2018 means that COP8 and subsequent COP sessions will be immediately followed by the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (MOP). While interested high income countries will be able to send complex and extensive delegations drawing on expertise from across multiple ministries, countries struggling to send a minimalist delegation might be expected to send an official from, for example, customs and excise rather than health.
It is, of course, highly desirable that the COP (and MOP) should be able to engage with and work across multiple ministries and policy spheres. Yet such a shift also clearly aligns, however inadvertently, with PMI's desire to "[m]ove tobacco issues away from [health]" by "push[ing] for a balanced delegation"; that is, one with much stronger representation from ministries of finance, commerce and industry. 23 The tobacco industry's desire to undermine the pre-eminence of health officials at the COP serves as a reminder that the wider primacy of health goals in addressing tobacco issues within the UN system and global governance is neither inevitable nor unchallenged. WHO did not assume lead status on tobacco issues within the UN until the development of the FCTC 2 ; some agencies, notably the International Labour Organization, have been strikingly reluctant to manage risks of tobacco industry interference in policy 35 ; and it cannot be assumed that governance instruments established to promote health will not be subverted to advance other agendas. The potential for the tobacco industry to appropriate core aspects of the ITP, including by countries adopting the industrydesigned product pack marker system CODENTIFY 36,37 (now Inexto Suite) emphasises the need to buttress the strength of health-oriented officials in delegations for FCTC negotiations.
This case is reinforced by our analysis demonstrating a broad correlation between Parties' attendance at the COP and the strength of their national tobacco control policies, as indicated by legislation on tobacco taxation, smoke-free public places and bans on advertising, promotion and sponsorship. This finding is perhaps unsurprising, since attendance at the COP and implementation of key FCTC measures will both be linked to a country's commitment to and capacity for advancing tobacco control 16, 38 ; while, less positively, low levels of COP attendance and weak implementation of tobacco control may reflect low political commitment or be linked with higher levels of industry involvement in national policy. 15 Yet this correlation also speaks to the value of countries' participation in global health governance in terms of democratic participation, policy engagement and capacity-building.
COP meetings are a forum for exchanging information and experience, promoting best practice, and increasing awareness of both threats and opportunities to effective tobacco control 16 , and participation can be expected to both strengthens and be strengthened by delegates' commitment to reducing the future health burden of tobacco. 39 This relationship may be particularly important for low income countries, in whom we found the strongest correlation between COP attendance and implementation of advertising bans (often seen as one of the first steps in a national tobacco control strategy 40 ). Such dynamics have long been viewed as central to the wider process impacts of the FCTC, with information exchange seen as crucial to accelerating policy diffusion. 41 In turn this suggests that there is a strong case for viewing strong investment in travel support, which may be viewed as something of a bureaucratic burden, as a core investment in global tobacco control; maximising Parties' participation in the COP should be framed as an important mechanism for advancing implementation of the FCTC.
Our study has some limitations, most notably its reliance on official records for details of In conclusion, our study highlights the importance of maintaining structural support to protect Parties' participation in the COP, particularly that of low and lower-middle income countries.
The FCTC has rightly been hailed as a rare example of effective global governance in which developing countries have played a significant role, 3, 42 but its ongoing success and effectiveness are not a given. In many respects the FCTC remains surprisingly fragile; its financial basis and support structure still require further development. 16 Maintaining high levels of representation and participation at the COP requires sustained attention on the policy agenda alongside maximizing transparency in delegations and developing a strategic framework for FCTC implementation. Contributors JC conceptualised the study; EP developed and undertook data analysis, with support from JC and SH; EP, SH and AW wrote the first draft; all authors contributed to the writing of the manuscript and agree with its results and conclusions.
